Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.
Introduction
The concept of rent-seeking (Tullock, 1967; Krueger, 1974; Bhagwati, 1982) has found wide-spread application in economics and political theory.
1 Two main classes of game-theoretic models have been distinguished in the literature. 2 In one class of models, the prize is allocated according to a stochastic success function, where a higher bid tends to increase a player's probability of winning-but typically not too strongly (Tullock, 1980; Pérez-Castrillo and Verdier, 1992; Nti, 1999; Cornes and Hartley, 2005) . In another class of models, represented by the (first-price) all-pay auction, the prize is always awarded to the highest bidder (Hillman and Samet, 1987; Hillman and Riley, 1989; Baye et al., 1996) . 3 These two classes of models have traditionally been analyzed separately and sometimes with different conclusions.
4
The first paper that ventured into the no man's land between the two classes of models was Baye et al. (1994) , who showed that the symmetric two-player Tullock contest with finite R > 2 allows a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in which both players have an expected payoff of zero. Che and Gale (2000) addressed similar issues in a somewhat different framework.
Considering a success function of the difference form, they characterized two main classes of equilibria, and showed that, as the noise diminishes, equilibrium payoffs in the contest converge to the corresponding payoffs of the 1 See, e.g., the collective volume by Congleton et al. (2008) . 2 These are sometimes referred to as imperfectly and perfectly discriminating contests (Hillman and Riley, 1989; Nitzan, 1994) .
3 Needless to say, the basic model of the all-pay auction has been extended in numerous ways. See, for instance, Clark and Rijs (1998) , Che and Gale (1998) , Konrad (2002) , and Siegel (2009 Siegel ( , 2010 .
4 For example, while in an all-pay auction, it may be optimal for a revenue-maximizing politician to exclude the lobbyist with the highest valuation (Baye et al., 1993) , this is never the case for the lottery contest (Fang, 2002) .
all-pay auction. For success functions in the tradition of the Tullock contest, however, Che and Gale (2000, p. 23 ) noted that it was not known if the qualitative properties of the mixed equilibrium in the all-pay auction (with heterogeneous valuations) would be similarly preserved if the success function is slightly perturbed.
Substantial progress in this regard has been made by Alcade and Dahm (2010) . Specifically, they identified conditions under which a given rentseeking game allows an all-pay auction equilibrium that, as the term indicates, shares important characteristics with an equilibrium of the corresponding all-pay auction.
5 The construction starts from a symmetric equilibrium with complete rent-dissipation in a two-player contest with homogeneous valuations, and exploits the fact that, with two players, introducing a mass point at the zero bid of one player is equivalent to a proportional reduction of the valuation of the other player. Since additional, low-valuation players have little incentive to enter the active contest, this indeed allows to construct an all-pay auction equilibrium in the rent-seeking game. As Alcade and Dahm (2010, p. 5) conclude, however, their results are partial without an improved understanding of the entire equilibrium set. As a matter of fact, one can
show that additional, payoff-inequivalent equilibria do exist.
6
In this paper, we consider rent-seeking games in which a small percentage change in a player's bid has a large percentage impact on her odds of winning, i.e., on the ratio between her respective probabilities of winning 5 Provided that valuations are "sufficiently generic," i.e., provided that the all-pay auction has a unique equilibrium, an all-pay auction equilibrium is equivalent in terms of participation probabilities, average bid levels, winning probabilities, and expected payoffs. In general, the equivalence is required for a selected equilibrium of the all-pay auction.
6 See Appendix B for an example.
and losing. Under this condition, it is shown that, for "sufficiently generic"
valuations, actually any equilibrium of the rent-seeking game is an all-pay auction equilibrium and, thus, both payoff-and revenue-equivalent to the outcome of the corresponding all-pay auction. Moreover, for general valuations, we establish a robustness property of the all-pay auction that addresses the above-mentioned issues, in particular by making a statement about the entire equilibrium set.
The analysis proceeds as follows. We first show, by extending existing arguments, that a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium always exists in a rentseeking game with heterogeneous valuations. Then, the equilibrium set is examined with a focus on the minimum of the support of the players' bid distributions, as previously done by Baye at al. (1994) and Alcade and Dahm (2010) in discrete settings. In that part of the analysis, to accomplish the step from homogeneous to heterogeneous valuations, we essentially reverse the construction of Alcade and Dahm (2010) . However, we also make use of a couple of new inequalities for winning probabilities when bids are close to each other. Finally, we re-use the tools developed mainly for the characterization of the equilibrium set to derive the robustness result.
The example of the n-player Tullock contest with heterogeneous valuations illustrates our findings. 7 First, for n = 2 and R > 2, any equilibrium is 7 It might be useful to briefly recall what is known about the equilibrium set of the Tullock contest. For low values of the usual parameter R (see Section 6), pure-strategy Nash equilibria have been characterized through the players' first-order conditions (Pérez-Castrillo and Verdier, 1992; Nti, 1999; Cornes and Hartley, 2005) . For high values of R, the equilibrium set is less completely explored. Baye et al. (1994) proved the existence of a symmetric equilibrium with complete rent dissipation in two-player contests with R > 2. Alcade and Dahm (2010) found a symmetric equilibrium in n-player contests with R > 2, as well as an all-pay auction equilibrium in n-player contests with heterogeneous valuations and R > 2. Finally, in a companion paper (2015) , it is shown that any symmetric shown to be an all-pay auction equilibrium. Second, for "sufficiently generic" valuations, and R sufficiently large, all but the two strongest players remain passive in any equilibrium, so that the equilibrium may be characterized just as in the case n = 2. Further, if R not sufficiently large, and if n ≥ 3, then there may be multiple, payoff-inequivalent equilibria in which the preemptive rent need not go to the strongest player. Finally, for general valuations, any sequence of equilibria associated with a sequence of Tullock contests with R → ∞ induces a sequence of payoff profiles that converges to the unique payoff profile of the corresponding all-pay auction.
The all-pay auction is known to be robust with respect to the introduction of private information. Indeed, as Amann and Leininger (1996) have shown, a symmetric two-player all-pay auction with independent types has a unique Bayesian equilibrium that converges to the complete information outcome as the distributions of valuations degenerate. A microfoundation of effort choice in the all-pay auction has been provided by Lang et al. (2014) . Specifically, if individual production is a Poisson process for which the respective player chooses a stopping time, then the distribution of breakthroughs corresponds to the distribution of equilibrium efforts in the all-pay auction.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the set-up. Section 3 establishes existence. Section 4 presents the equilibrium characterization. Section 5 discusses the robustness of the all-pay auction.
An example is presented in Section 6. Section 7 concludes. Most proofs have been collected in Appendix A. Appendix B contains an extended example.
equilibrium in an n-player contest with R > n/(n − 1) involves arbitrarily small positive bids and exhibits complete rent dissipation.
Set-up and notation
There are n ≥ 2 players. Player i = 1, ..., n values the prize of the contest at V i > 0, and chooses a bid b i ≥ 0. Decisions are made simultaneously and independently. Without loss of generality, players are renamed such that
By a contest success function Ψ, or CSF, we mean a vector of functions
8 For convenience, we will use the notation
The following assumptions will be imposed on the CSF:
+ , and any i ∈ {1, ..., n}; moreover,
+ , and any i, j ∈ {1, ..., n} such that
, and any i ∈ {1, ..., n}.
, and any i ∈ {1, ..., n}. Smoothness is imposed for convenience, and could probably be relaxed. For example, while the limit case of the all-pay auction does not satisfy Assumption 4, our equilibrium characterizations hold also in the limit (Baye et al., 1996) . Assumptions 1-4 above will be used in the sequel without explicit mentioning.
bids exceeding V i are strictly dominated by a zero bid. Thus, without loss of generality, it may be assumed that each player i = 1, ..., n chooses her bid from the compact and non-empty interval
.., V n ), we will refer to the resulting non-cooperative game as the n-player rent-seeking game with CSF Ψ.
Following Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) , a mixed strategy for player i is a probability measure µ i on the Borel sets of B i . We write D(B i ) for the set of player i's mixed strategies, where pure strategies are contained as degenerate measures. The support of a mixed strategy µ i ∈ D(B i ) will be denoted by
as player i's probability of participation. Player i will be called passive if A mixed equilibrium is an n-tuple µ
such that each player maximizes her ex-ante expected payoff, i.e., such that
for any i = 1, ..., n, where µ *
respectively, player i's ex-ante probability of winning, and player i's average bid level. Player i's equilibrium payoff, or rent, may then be written as
Existence
Since any CSF satisfying Assumption 2 is discontinuous, Glicksberg's theorem does not apply. Existence of a mixed equilibrium is, therefore, shown below. Related results of existence not covering the present situation can be found in Baye et al. (1994) , Yang (1994) , and Alcade and Dahm (2010) .
Lemma 1. A mixed equilibrium µ * exists in any n-player rent-seeking game with heterogeneous valuations.
Proof. Assume that, instead of maximizing her payoff
Clearly, this does not affect the equilibrium set. We check the conditions of Dasgupta and Maskin (1986, Th. 5 & fn. 14) . Note first that the set of discontinuities of
is bounded and continuous in b i , for any b −i = 0, and any i = 1, ..., n. Finally,
is bounded and lower semi-continuous in b i , for any i = 1, ..., n. The claim follows.
Equilibrium characterization
We start by introducing, on the set of CSFs, a measure of proximity to the technology of the all-pay auction. Following Che and Gale (1997) , we think here of a proxy for the political culture or of a choice variable for a politician.
For a given CSF Ψ, the ratio Q i = Ψ i /(1−Ψ i ) will be referred to as player i's odds of winning. At a bid vector (b i , b −i ) ∈ R n + , the own-bid elasticity of player i's odds of winning is
Note that ρ i is well-defined if b i > 0 and b −i = 0. Define now the decisiveness
, as the joint infimum of the functions ρ i over the relevant domains.
As an elasticity, the parameter ρ allows the usual graphical interpretation. For instance, in the limit case of the all-pay auction, the odds of winning would jump from zero to infinity at the highest competing bid, which corresponds to a perfectly elastic odds of winning. In the other extreme, a pure lottery, the odds of winning are constant, and hence, perfectly inelastic. We are interested here in the case where ρ is large, which means that a small percentage change in the bid has a large percentage impact on the odds of winning. In other words, there is little "noise" in the contest technology.
9
Conditions on a rent-seeking game such that all of its equilibria share key characteristics with the corresponding equilibrium of the all-pay auction are 9 Indeed, many commonly used CSF allow a microfoundation in terms of either uncertainty (Jia, 2008; Fu and Lu, 2012) or incomplete information (Eccles and Wegner, 2014) .
provided below. We start with the case of two contestants, for which the equivalence is the strongest. Proof. See the Appendix.
The conclusions of Proposition 1 match those for the all-pay auction (Hillman and Riley, 1989, Prop. 2) . In particular, if n = 2 and ρ(Ψ) > 2, then the rent-seeking game with CSF Ψ and the all-pay auction are equivalent both in terms of expected payoffs and in terms of expected revenue.
Proposition 1 strengthens the conclusions of Alcade and Dahm (2010) by
showing that properties (A1-A2) are definitely not the result of a purposeful construction, but hold for any mixed equilibrium of the rent-seeking game.
The result is obtained, in particular, by relying on a somewhat different set of assumptions.
10 10 Alcade and Dahm (2010) use two main assumptions, (E1) and (E2). Roughly speaking, (E1) imposes an inverse U-shape on the best-response mapping, whereas (E2) captures that success probabilities are sensitive to bids when bids are close. The present analysis drops (E1), yet strengthens (E2).
The idea of the proof is simple. If a CFS is very decisive, then any range of bids used with positive probability may be rationalized only if the opponent makes use of strictly smaller positive bids. Therefore, there is a sense in which the equilibrium unravels, and both players must use arbitrarily small positive bids. However, arbitrarily small positive bids can win with substantial probability only against a zero bid. Thus, either both players are always active and dissipate all rents, or there is one player that is not always active. Either way, there is at most one player with a positive rent.
By reverting the construction in Alcade and Dahm (2010) , it can then be shown that any rent accrues to player 1 and equals
The analysis of the rent-seeking game complicates for n ≥ 3 players.
One reason for this is the well-known fact that the all-pay auction allows a continuum of equilibria if V 2 = V 3 (Baye et al., 1996) . While those equilibria are all payoff-equivalent, they need not be equivalent in terms of revenue. In fact, in this case, equilibria may also differ in terms of lowest positive bids, participation probabilities, average bid levels, and expected win probabilities.
The following result covers at least all those "sufficiently generic" valuation profiles for which the all-pay auction has a unique equilibrium.
Proposition 2. Consider an n-player rent-seeking game with CSF Ψ and
ciently large, any mixed equilibrium µ * satisfies properties (A1-A2). Moreover, players 3, ..., n remain passive.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 2 may be understood as a variation of the corresponding unique-ness result for the all-pay auction (Hillman and Riley, 1989, Prop. 4) . The main point to prove is that there is no equilibrium in which any of the players 3, ..., n is active. This is accomplished by showing that if, say, player 3 was active, then players 1 and 2 could individually ensure a positive expected payoff by deviating tob 3 . But this would imply that more than one player earns a positive rent, which is impossible, as we show, even in n-player rentseeking games with n ≥ 3. Consistent with that intuition, the conclusions of Proposition 2 rely crucially on the assumption that ρ is sufficiently large, and therefore, as mentioned before, need not hold under more flexible conditions of Alcade and Dahm (2010) . 
Robustness of the all-pay auction
We arrive at the promised robustness result. Considered is a setting with n ≥ 2 players and arbitrary valuations. Proof. See the Appendix.
Thus, a small change in the technology of the all-pay auction does not affect the equilibrium set very much. For generic valuations, the limit is reached 11 The present analysis does not require a characterization of the equilibrium set for the case V 2 = V 3 . We conjecture, however, that payoff-equivalence breaks down for asymmetric equilibria with more than two active players.
already for a finite m. For non-generic payoffs, however, taking the limit seems necessary.
Example
Following Tullock (1980) , suppose that
where R > 0. One can easily check that ρ(Ψ) = R. 12 Indeed,
which implies the claim. Thus, as outlined in the Introduction, immediate variants of the results above hold, in particular, for the Tullock contest. 
Conclusion
This paper has continued the study of the relationship between rent-seeking games and the all-pay auction. The own-bid elasticity of a player's odds of winning has been employed as an intuitive measure of the proximity between a rent-seeking game and the all-pay auction. Conditions have been provided under which any mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium of an n-player rent-seeking game is both payoff-and revenue-equivalent to the outcome of the corresponding all-pay auction. Moreover, it was shown that, as the rent-seeking game approaches the all-pay auction, the payoff profile of any equilibrium converges to the payoff profile of the corresponding all-pay auction.
The analysis has also provided a general existence result for mixed equilibria in rent-seeking games with heterogeneous valuations, and has revealed some potentially important properties of the equilibrium set of the asymmetric n-player Tullock contest with large R.
14 Our findings have immediate implications for policy work such as Ellingsen (1991) . For example, even if the political contest is not perfectly discriminating, costly lobbying by the demand side will unambiguously increase welfare.
Furthermore, excluding the possibility of alternative, say collusive, equilibria is obviously important for the reliability of empirical estimates of rent-seeking expenditures.
15 Last but not least, the analysis has shown that the exclusion principle of Baye et al. (1993) extends quite robustly to a large class of rent-seeking games.
Applications are not restricted to static settings. By backwards induction, decisions in any stage depend solely on expected payoffs in later stages. Thus, revenue equivalence applies to pairwise elimination tournaments (Rosen, 1986; Groh et al., 2012) and implies, e.g., that optimal seedings do not change when some noise enters the respective success functions for semifinals and finals.
Analogous conclusions may be drawn for sequential contests (e.g., Konrad, 2004; Klumpp and Polborn, 2006; Konrad and Kovenock; 2009; Sela, 2012) .
14 E.g., our results might prove useful for verifying or rejecting the conjecture of Franke et al. (2014, p. 125) , which says that optimally biased n-player Tullock contests with sufficiently large R extract a revenue of (V 1 + V 2 )/2.
15 Cf. the survey by Del Rosal (2011, Sec. 2.1).
Appendix A: Proofs
This appendix contains proofs of Propositions 1 through 3. We prepare those proofs with altogether six lemmas.
Lemma A.1. Consider an n-player rent-seeking game. Then, in any mixed equilibrium µ * , there are players i = j such that π i = 1 and π j > 0.
Proof. Suppose that π i < 1 for i = 1, ..., n. Then player 1, say, could raise her zero bids to some small ε > 0, thereby increasing the probability to win against coincident zero bids of players 2, ..., n from Ψ 1 (0, ..., 0) = 1/n to Ψ 1 (ε, 0, ..., 0) = 1. Further, if π j = 0 for any j = i, then player i could profitably shade her positive bids.
Lemma A.2. Consider an n-player rent-seeking game with ρ(Ψ) > 2. Then, in any mixed equilibrium µ * with π i = 1, it holds that, (i) b j = 0 for any j = i, and (ii) Π * j = 0 for any j = i.
Proof. (i) Suppose that b j > 0 for some j = i. The main case to consider
However, since b i > 0 is an optimum, the left-hand side of (8) (ii) Clearly, Π * j = 0 if π j < 1. Assume, therefore, that π j = 1. Since
. Using Lebesgue's theorem, this implies
If Proof. Since Π * 2 = 0, a deviation by player 2 to player 1's equilibrium strategy µ * 1 would necessarily yield weakly negative expected payoffs for player 2,
By symmetry,
Summing up yields
with p * 1 + p * 2 = 1. If V 1 > V 2 , then (13) implies p * 2 ≤ 1/2, so that, using (11),
Similarly, V 1 < V 2 leads to a contradiction. Hence, V 1 = V 2 , and (13) is an equality. But then, (11) and (12) must be equalities as well. Thus, also p *
Proof. Since winning probabilities across players sum up to one,
for any b ∈ R n + . Evaluating at b j = b i , one obtains
Using (14) with b j = 0, the lemma follows.
Lemma A.5. Fix κ > 1. Then, provided that ρ(Ψ) is sufficiently large,
and some b −i,j ∈ R n−2 + . Then, obviously, Ψ i,j (κb j , b j , b −i,j ) ≤ 1/κ, and hence,
for anyκ ∈ [1, κ]. Consequently, using the fundamental theorem of calculus,
But, ln κ+ Proof. Note that π j > 0 ensuresb j > 0. Since a zero bid guarantees a nonnegative expected payoff, this implies
Multiplying through with κ ≡ V i /V j > 1 delivers
Moreover, choosing ρ sufficiently large, Lemma A.5 implies that for any
Combining this with (22) Tak Proof of Proposition 2. Suppose that there is a mixed equilibrium µ * in which some player j ∈ {3, ..., n} is active. Since
A.6 implies that Π * 1 > 0 and Π * 2 > 0. But then, π 1 = π 2 = 1, which is impossible in view of Lemma A.2.
Proof of Proposition 3. The proof has three parts.
The claim is obvious for V 1 = V 2 . Assume, therefore, that V 1 > V 2 . Suppose that player 1 choosesb 1 = V 2 in the rent-seeking game with CSF Ψ m . Then, since players 2, ..., n never bid
. Moreover, if player 1 raises her bid tob 1 = (1 + ε)b 1 , for some small ε > 0, then
where the right-hand side grows above all finite bounds as m → ∞. Therefore, for m sufficiently large, Ψ
It follows that, for any fixed ε > 0, a sufficiently large choice of m en- 
Fix some κ > 1. Then, provided that m is sufficiently large, Lemma A.5 implies that, for any
Combining this with (28), taking expectations with respect to µ 
Dividing (33) by κ, and choosing κ sufficiently close to one, ensures that is an all-pay auction equilibrium. Thus, indeed, Π * 12 ≤ p 12 (V 1 − V 3 ). Note next that player 1's probability of winning, once µ * 3 is taken into account, is lowered by
= E b
> p 12 · 1 2 R+2 · (
where Jensen's inequality has been used. Therefore, player 1's expected payoff from bidding b 1 in the three-player contest against µ * 2 and µ * 3 is
If V 1 and V 3 are sufficiently close to each other, so that V 1 − V 3 < V 1 /2 R+3 and (V 3 /V 1 ) 2R > 1/2, then the right-hand side of (41) 
